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Differential Accumulation and Middle
East Wars – Beyond Neo-Liberalism
Shimshon Bichler and Jonathan Nitzan1
It is popular these days to talk about the ‘discontent’ of neo-liberal globali-
sation. This ‘discontent’ is no longer the prerogative of intellectuals.
Increasingly, it comes from below, with opposition from the grassroots. But
there may be another type of discontent lurking behind the scenes. This
other discontent comes from above. It is the discontent of the ruling class.
In our opinion, the world may have reached a historical junction in which
a significant part of the global ruling class has become discontented with
neo-liberalism. 
Many may find this a strange assertion to make. On the Left, it has
become an article of faith that capitalists are hooked on neo-liberalism.
According to this view, there is nothing capitalists love more than open
borders and capital flow. What they want is liberalisation and free trade,
sound finance and tight monetary policy, small governments with budget
surpluses, global villageism and peace dividends, and, of course, price
stability and economic growth. But then, according to these criteria, the
world today is far less neo-liberal than it was only a few years ago. Indeed,
in many respects, neo-liberalism has gone into reverse. We have had a
massive decline in the global flow of capital. We have soaring budget
deficits, certainly in the United States. We have extremely loose monetary
policy and central bankers who say that inflation is too low. And we have a
U-turn from peace dividend to war profits.
Are these signs, then, that capitalists are ‘losing their grip’? Not really.
We need to be careful not to confuse means with ends. Capitalists do not
seek neo-liberalism. They seek accumulation. Neo-liberalism – whatever its
precise meaning – is a means to an end; it is not an end in itself. And at the
present conjunction, it seems that the cost of neo-liberalism to accumula-
tors has begun to outweigh its benefits. In this sense, neo-liberalism may
have become a fetter on accumulation.
The purpose of this chapter is threefold: (1) to explain why the world’s
dominant capital groups have become discontented with neo-liberal glob-
alisation; (2) to speculate on what may replace neo-liberal globalisation;
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and (3) to link this transition in the nature of accumulation to the new
wars. 
Capital as power
The biggest dilemma of political economy is how to both separate and inte-
grate ‘economics’ and ‘politics’. This dilemma is most vivid in the way we
treat capital. Everyone knows that capital is about power. And, yet, when
theorists come to conceptualise the quantitative nature of capital, they
treat it solely in terms of production and consumption – that is, in terms of
labour time or in terms of utility. Our view is completely different. What
gets accumulated, we argue, cannot be understood in the narrow terms of
consumption and production. Capital represents neither economic or
statist ‘utility’ on the one hand, nor dead labour – whether material or
imperial – on the other. In our opinion, capital is commodified power. The
value of capital on the stock and bond markets represents the power of its
owners to shape the social process as a whole. 
Now, in the minds of the leading accumulators, this power – and there-
fore the process of accumulation – is relative, not absolute. The goal of
leading accumulators is to accumulate more financial claims. More
financial claims mean not more material things, but more power. And more
power is always and everywhere a differential process.2 Think of the largest
ownership groups, the ‘dominant capital’ of contemporary capitalism.
Their yardstick for accumulation is always some average benchmark – a
sector benchmark, a national benchmark, and, increasingly, a global
benchmark. For these groups, to accumulate means to accumulate faster
than that average benchmark. The reason is simple enough: for dominant
capital to accumulate faster than the average, by definition, is to increase
its share of the total. And to increase its share of the total is to gain more
power.
The implication of this claim is far reaching. If accumulation indeed is
differential rather than absolute, then that means, first, that many cher-
ished beliefs about capitalism are no longer tenable; and, secondly, that we
need to think of alternative explanations.
Merger or stagﬂation?
Let us look at two such cherished beliefs. The first is that accumulation is
synonymous with economic growth. The second is that capitalists like
price stability and hate inflation.
Begin with economic growth. There is no denying that the growth
process is central to capitalism in general. But if we focus specifically on dif-
ferential accumulation, there is another process which has become more
important, and that is the process of corporate merger – or what we call
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‘breadth’. Figure 4.1 shows the ‘Buy-to-Build Ratio’ for the United States.
This index measures, for each year, the ratio between the dollar value of
mergers and acquisitions and the dollar value put into building new facto-
ries, or what economists call ‘real’ investment. 
Note the explosive growth of this ratio, plotted on a logarithmic scale. In
the late nineteenth century, there was less than one cent worth of mergers
and acquisitions for every one dollar of ‘real’ investment. Fast forward
another hundred years, and for every one dollar of ‘real’ investment there
were over two dollars put into mergers. In other words, over the entire
period mergers have grown roughly 300 times faster than ‘real’ investment. 
Does this process make any sense? From the viewpoint of absolute accu-
mulation, not really. Mergers do not add more machines, more utility or
more dead labour. They simply reshuffle ownership. But from the view-
point of differential accumulation, the process makes a great deal of sense.
For dominant capital, ‘too much’ green-field investment is disastrous. It
means glut; it means falling prices; and, eventually, it means differential
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Figure 4.1 Corporate Amalgamation in the United States
Source: Nitzan and Bichler, 2002, Data Appendix, 82–3. Updated to 2001.
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decumulation – including the possible disintegration of the existing grid of
power, institutions and capabilities. Clearly, it is much better to buy than
to build. Buying helps dominant capital kill three birds in one stone: (1) it
does not create any new capacity; (2) it expands control; and (3) it helps
profits grow faster than the average – since, by definition, the average
remains the same.
This focus on merger helps explain the globalisation zeal of the past 
twenty years. If we look carefully at the chart, we see four merger waves.
Each of these waves occurred within a given ‘corporate universe’. (1) The
monopoly wave of the turn of the century occurred within individual
industries; (2) the oligopoly wave of the 1920s occurred within sectors; 
(3) the conglomerate wave of the 1960s took place across the entire busi-
ness sector; and (4) the last wave of the 1980s and 1990s was, by and large,
global. This historical ‘progression’ is not without logic. When expanding
through merger, dominant capital eventually takes over everything worth
owning in its original universe. And once it reaches that point, the only
way to continue merging is to break this original envelope and go to the
next one. This logic explains the progression from the industry, to the
sector, to the national border. And eventually, when the national scene
becomes highly centralised, it explains why there is no choice but to ‘go
global’. It should be emphasised here that each ‘breaking of the envelope’
involves more than a mere change in ownership. Typically, it is accompa-
nied by a comprehensive social transformation, including changes in ideol-
ogy, policy, organisation and institutions. From this perspective,
‘neo-liberal globalisation’ – both as an ideology and as a practice – was a
matter not of choice but of necessity: without it, the fourth merger wave
could not have happened. 
Now, merger is not always possible. It transpires from the chart that each
of the merger waves eventually collapsed. And this is where inflation – or
‘depth,’ as we call it – comes into the picture. 
Inﬂation and redistribution
As noted, the conventional wisdom is that inflation is a bad thing for capi-
talism – and, of course, there is some truth to that claim. Inflation is a
major de-stabiliser, and too much instability is dangerous for any social
order. But inflation also has a major upside which political economists
often ignore, and that is redistribution. 
Inflation redistributes income in many ways, of which we emphasise
two. The first is redistribution from workers to capitalists. Figure 4.2 illus-
trates this process in the United States. One series in the chart measures
the ratio between corporate earnings per share and the average wage rate.
When this ratio goes up, income is redistributed from workers to capital-
ists. When the ratio goes down, income is redistributed in the other
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direction, from capitalists to workers. The other series in the chart shows
the annual inflation rate, measured by the wholesale price index. The
data in the figure go back more than fifty years, so they certainly can tell
us something about the historical pattern. And what they tell us is that,
in general, US inflation has worked in favour of capitalists and against
workers. When inflation was up, capitalists tended to gain and workers to
lose.3
The second redistribution is from small to large firms, with inflation
acting as a mechanism of differential accumulation. This latter process 
is illustrated in Figure 4.3, which, again, pertains to the United States. 
One line in the figure shows the ratio between the profit mark-up of the
Fortune 500 and the average profit mark-up in the business sector as a
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Figure 4.2 US Inflation and Capital-Labour Redistribution
* Corporate earnings per share are for the S&P 500 Index (ratio of price to price/earnings). The
wage rate is the average hourly earning in the private sector.
Note: Series are smoothed as 3-year moving averages.
Source: Global Financial Data (series codes: _SPXD for price; SPPECOMW for price/earnings); US
Department of Commerce and US Bureau of Labour Statistics through WEFA (series codes:
AHEEAP for the wage rate; WPINS for the wholesale price index).
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whole. When this ratio goes up, it means that the mark-up of large firms
rises faster (or falls more slowly) than the average mark-up. When the ratio
goes down, it means that the mark-up of large firms rises more slowly (or
falls faster) than the average mark-up. This ratio, then, is a proxy for differ-
ential accumulation by dominant capital. The other line denotes the rate of
inflation. And, again, the correlation here is tightly positive. Inflation
clearly is a mechanism of differential accumulation.4
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Figure 4.3 US Inflation and Differential Accumulation
* The mark-up is the per cent of net profit in sales. The Fortune 500 mark-up is the per cent of
after tax profit in sales revenues. The business sector mark-up is computed by dividing total cor-
porate profit after tax, with IVA and CCA (from the national income accounts), by total business
receipts from the IRS. The ‘Ratio of Mark-ups’ is given by dividing the Fortune 500 mark-up by
the business sector mark-up.
Note: Until 1993, the Fortune 500 list included only industrial corporations (firms deriving at
least half their sales revenues from manufacturing or mining). From 1994 onward, the list
includes all corporations. For 1992–3, data for Fortune 500 companies are reported without SFAS
106 special charges. All series are smoothed as 3-year moving averages.
Source: US Department of Commerce through WEFA (series codes: ZAADJ for total corporate
profit after tax with IVA and CCA; WPINS for the wholesale price index); US Internal Revenue
Service; Fortune.
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So, contrary to what mainstream economists like to tell us, inflation is by
no means ‘neutral’. On the contrary, it is a very potent engine of accumula-
tion. Of course, a rise in prices does not increase the ‘amount’ of machines.
But accumulation is not about machines; it is about increasing capitalist
power in general and differential power in particular. And here inflation
seems to work wonders.
But if inflation is such a good thing for capitalists, why do we not have it
all the time? The short answer is that we do. Figure 4.4, which takes Britain
as an example, shows that during the twentieth century prices have risen
by almost 5,000%. Just to put this number in perspective, during the
previous six centuries combined prices rose by less than 800%. Moreover,
whereas prices previously oscillated up and down around their positive
trend, in the twentieth century, with the exception of the Great
Depression, their direction was always up. But then, again, if inflation is
so good for capitalists, why do they oppose it? As we shall see shortly,
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they do not always oppose it. And when they do, it is because inflation is
a risky business, with serious downsides. Contrary to popular belief, over
the long run inflation tends to appear as stagflation; that is, inflation
together with stagnation. Moreover, some stagnation in fact is a precondi-
tion for inflation.5 Figure 4.5 plots the long-term relationship in the
United States between inflation on the vertical axis and economic growth
on the horizontal axis. The correlation in the chart clearly is negative,
not positive, and the US is hardly an exception in this regard. In fact, the
same negative long-term relationship is evident in most countries. The
stagnation which tends to come with inflation, along with other aspects
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of social instability, raises risk perceptions, and rising risk is a big nega-
tive for accumulation.
To summarise, inflation is a double-edged sword. It boosts differential
accumulation, but it also destabilises society. It tends to redistribute
income from workers to capitalists and from small to big capitalists, but the
accompanying rise in unemployment and uncertainty raises risk and often
mitigates these differential gains. So although inflation is ‘accumulation-
friendly,’ particularly to large capitalists, dominant capital endorses it only
reluctantly, when it feels that ‘there is no alternative’. And this feeling of
‘no alternative’ tends to develop when mergers go into hibernation.
The pendulum
The historical relationship between merger and stagflation is very interest-
ing and largely unexplored.6 Figure 4.6 describes their related patterns for
the United States. The top line in the chart is a stagflation index. The index
is constructed, first, by measuring the standard deviations of inflation from
its average; then, by computing the standard deviation of unemployment
from its average; and finally by taking the average of the two indices. A
zero reading on the combined index denotes the average rate of stagflation,
a high reading indicates above-average inflation, and a low reading means
below-average stagflation.7 The lower line in the figure is the ‘Buy-to-Build
Ratio’. As we saw, this index measures the ratio between the dollar value of
mergers and acquisitions and the dollar value of ‘real’ investment. It
appears from this chart that mergers and stagflation have moved counter-
cyclically, sort of a mirror image of one another, and that this ‘inverse’
pattern has become more pronounced over time. During a merger boom,
stagflation typically tended to recede; and when the merger wave died
down, stagflation commonly rose to compensate.
What we are proposing here, then, is a radically different understand-
ing of accumulation. The starting point is not capital in general, but the
dominant capital groups at the centre of the process. These groups are 
the ‘political engine’ of accumulation – the ‘conscious agents’ who push
the process forward. These groups seek not absolute, but differential accu-
mulation. And they achieve their goal not through growth and price
stability, but through a pendulum which swings between long periods 
of ‘breadth’ through mergers and shorter periods of ‘depth’ through
stagflation.
The current crossroads
Now, let us look more closely at the last twenty years in Figure 4.6. On the
one hand, we see a global merger mania building up, along with a neo-
liberal ideology which emphasises deregulation and capital mobility in a
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‘global village’. On the other hand, stagflation is in a free fall. And this side
of the equation goes well with the neo-liberal rhetoric of small government
and sound finance. But in 2000 we hit a turning point. Mergers have col-
lapsed, the stock market has melted, and the ‘new economy’ has been
exposed as a fraud. Historically, falling mergers have triggered rising
stagflation, and it seems from the chart that in 2002 the long downtrend of
stagflation may finally have bottomed out. But this time the shift toward
higher stagflation has not been easy to achieve. 
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Twenty years of neo-liberalism and free trade have created massive excess
capacity and huge competitive pressures coming mainly from East Asia.
During the 1990s, these developments were warmly welcomed. The policy
lingo was anti-inflationary and neo-liberal competition helped reduce
inflation. But the process has gone way too far. So much so that in 2003
the chairman of the Federal Reserve Board, Alan Greenspan, spoke of ‘an
unwelcome substantial fall of inflation’. To our knowledge, that was the
first time since the Great Depression that the Fed has made such a declara-
tion. And immediately after Greenspan’s statement, US Treasury Secretary
John Snow declared the end of a ‘strong dollar’ policy, which amounted to
a similar policy loosening from the fiscal side, with tax cuts and rising
spending soon to create America’s largest budget deficit ever. 
This sudden love for inflation is boosted by an old-new fear: deflation.
And why is deflation suddenly seen as a threat? Part of the answer lies in
Figure 4.7, which shows the ratio of total debt to GDP in the United States.
As we can see, in 1929, on the eve of the Great Depression, this ratio was
165%. In 2002, it reached 290% – the highest on record. Under these
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circumstances, if prices begin falling, firms will be unable to service their
debt – and then we face the risk of ‘debt deflation’, chain bankruptcies and
a total meltdown of accumulation; in other words, the ‘China Syndrome’
of capitalism.8
These considerations suggest that there is now a broad, pro-inflation
coalition. The outer perimeter of this coalition is the business sector as a
whole, which needs inflation in order to avert the prospect of debt
deflation. The inner circle is that of dominant capital which wants inflation
in order to continue its differential accumulation, now that mergers and
acquisitions are dead in the water. And these forces are increasingly
supported by central bankers and finance ministers who are priming the
monetary and fiscal pumps.
Oil prices, inﬂation and proﬁts
But wishful thinking and expansionary policies alone are not enough to
kick-start inflation – just look at the past decade in Japan. To ignite inflation,
a spark is necessary. And historically – at least over the past thirty years or so
– the spark which has ignited inflation has always come from the Middle
East, and, specifically, from the price of oil. The relationship between oil
prices and inflation is illustrated in Figure 4.8. One line in this chart mea-
sures the average rate of inflation in the industrialised countries. The other
line shows the ‘real’ price of oil – in other words, the dollar price deflated by
the US CPI. Oil prices clearly are a ‘leading indicator’ for inflation.9
Of course, the price of oil does not go up simply because one wants it to
rise. Someone – and specifically those who sell and buy oil – must
push/pull up this price. Now, everyone knows that crude oil producers, par-
ticularly OPEC, benefit from higher oil prices. But not too many people
realise that the oil companies – which are the biggest buyers of crude oil –
are also hooked on high oil prices. The reason for this addiction is simple
enough. If the input costs of these companies rise by 100%, and if their
mark-up stays the same (or rises), their profit, too, will rise by 100% (or
more). This relationship between oil prices and oil profits is illustrated in
Figure 4.9. 
One line in the chart shows the ‘real’ price of oil (the dollar price
divided by the US CPI). The other line shows the per cent share of oil
companies in global corporate profit. Clearly, the correlation between the
two series is extremely tight. During the oil crisis of the 1970s and early
1980s, the cost of oil shot through the roof. In 1979 a barrel of oil cost
over $90 in today’s prices. During those happy stagflationary times, the
oil companies pocketed nearly 20% of all global profits. But as mergers
and acquisitions picked up, inflation fell and oil prices dropped even
faster. The oil companies’ global share of profit collapsed, reaching a mere
3% during Clinton’s presidency. 
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Let us recapitulate and recall the following points: (1) we have firms the
world over scared of deflation; (2) we have dominant capital needing
inflation to substitute for mergers and acquisitions; (3) we have central
banks saying that inflation is too low; and (4) we now have OPEC and the
large oil companies who want oil prices to go up. A rise in the price of oil
will make them all heave a sigh of relief.
The new wars
But, then, how do you get oil prices to go up in a ‘world awash with oil,’ as
the Economist of London put it? The answer is cruel but simple: conflict in
the Middle East.
Since the 1960s, Middle East conflicts were closely related to oil in more
than one way. Figure 4.10 shows the history of differential accumulation
by leading oil companies – specifically, BP, Chevron, Exxon, Mobil, Royal
Dutch Shell and Texaco.10
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Each bar in the figure measures the difference between the rate of return
on equity of these companies and the average rate of return on equity of the
Fortune 500 benchmark. The grey bars show years of differential accumula-
tion; that is, years in which the leading oil companies beat the average with
a higher rate of return. The black bars show periods of differential decumula-
tion; that is, years in which the leading oil companies trailed the average.
For reasons to be explained below, these latter periods signal ‘danger’ in the
Middle East. Finally, the explosion signs show ‘Energy Conflicts’ – that is,
conflicts which were related, directly or indirectly, to oil.11 The figure
exhibits three related patterns, all remarkable in their persistence: 
• First, every energy conflict in the Middle East was preceded by a danger
zone, in which the oil companies suffered differential decumulation.
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• Secondly, every energy conflict was followed by a period during which
the oil companies beat the average.
• And, thirdly, with only one exception in 1996–7, the oil companies
never managed to beat the average without an ‘Energy Conflict’ first
taking place.12
At first sight, this pattern may look deterministic, but, in fact, it is not.
There are three different periods here, each characterised by a different regime
of differential accumulation, and each led by a different faction within domi-
nant capital. During the ‘depth’ era of the 1970s and early 1980s, differential
accumulation was fuelled by stagflation and driven by conflict. The leading
faction within dominant capital comprised the armament and petroleum
firms. In this context, the oil companies managed to beat the average comfort-
ably, with only occasional setbacks which were quickly ‘corrected’ by Middle
East conflicts. During the ‘breadth’ period of the 1980s and 1990s, merger
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replaced inflation as the main engine of differential accumulation The oil and
armament companies lost their primacy to a ‘new economy’ coalition led by
civilian high-tech companies. Neo-liberal rhetoric replaced the welfare-warfare
state, conflicts in the Middle East grew fewer and farther between, and the oil
companies commonly trailed the average. 
Events over the past three years suggest that this second period may have
come to an end. Liberalism requires relative price stability, but, as we have
seen, there is now a growing pro-inflation coalition, supported by dominant
capital in general and the oil companies in particular, along with central
bankers and finance ministers. For this inflation to take hold oil prices have
to go up, and for oil prices to go up there needs to be conflict in the Middle
East. This conflict, popularly known as the ‘infinite war on terror,’ means
the end of the global village and therefore a serious blow to liberal capital
mobility. Finally, the ‘war on terror’ justifies rising military spending. The
NeoCons in Washington said already in 2000 that they needed a ‘New
Pearl Harbour’ in order to reverse the long-term decline in US military
spending evident in Figure 4.11. September 11 has given America its ‘New
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Pearl Harbour’. Military spending in the United States is definitely on the
rise, and as we all know, soaring military spending means the end of liberal
fiscal ‘discipline’ and ‘lean’ government. 
Whether or not these are the hallmarks of a ‘new world order’ remains to
be seen. But if this new regime were to take hold, it would be the end of
neo-liberalism.
Notes
1 This chapter is based on our longer co-authored article, ‘Dominant Capital and
the New Wars,’ forthcoming in the Journal of World-Systems Research.
2 Note that all present-day ownership of capital is financial, and only financial.
Regardless of whether the underlying assets are classified by economists as
‘industrial,’ ‘commercial’ or ‘financial,’ the owner’s claim on these assets is
always a pecuniary magnitude. It is the ‘present value’ of a future stream of
earnings. Marx called such capital ‘fictitious’. ‘Actual capital,’ he asserted, con-
sisted of the surplus abstract labour embodied in the means of production,
work in progress and money. By contrast, a future financial claim, he said, was
a claim on surplus which had not yet been produced, and which may never be pro-
duced. Therefore, such claims had to be considered partly or wholly ‘fictitious’.
In our view, Marx’s terminology should be reversed. The only actual capital in
our world is a claim on future income. This claim is based on the uncertain
projections of capitalists, but it is observable, measured and very real. By
contrast, capital denominated in abstract labour is a purely theoretical fiction.
It can be neither seen nor measured and therefore tells us nothing about
accumulation.
3 Profit (π) is the product of the number of units sold (Q), the price per unit (P),
and the ratio of profit to sales revenues, or the mark-up (k). In order for capital-
ists to benefit relative to workers, the product of these three components has to
rise faster than the wage rate (w). This relative increase can occur in many differ-
ent ways: for instance, if Q and k remain unchanged but P rises faster than w; if
Q remains unaltered and the product P·k increases fast than w; etc. In this frame-
work, the positive correlation in Figure 4.2 suggests that the higher the rate of
inflation, the more rapid the combined increase in the three components of cor-
porate profit relative to the wage rate (changes in the number of corporate shares
also affect the ratio in the chart, but these changes usually are small relative to
the fluctuations of profit and wages). 
4 For the profit mark-up to rise, firms have to raise their prices faster (or have
them fall more slowly) than their unit cost (cf. labour, materials, interest and
taxes). For the mark-up of large firms to rise relative to the average mark-up, large
firms must be able to raise their price-to-cost ratio faster than the average price-
to-cost ratio. The positive correlation in Figure 4.3 suggests that this ability rises
and falls with the overall rate of inflation. 
5 For more on this issue, see Ch. 5: ‘The Making of Stagflation,’ in Nitzan and
Bichler, 2002.
6 To the best of our knowledge, we are the only ones to have investigated this
relationship. See Nitzan, 2001 and Nitzan and Bichler, 2002.
7 The continuous existence of under-utilised capacity and unemployed workers
means that the United States experienced some measure of stagnation through-
out the twentieth century. Also, with the exception of the 1930s, there was
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always some inflation. Strictly speaking, then, US inflation during that period
was always stagflationary.
8 As the Great Depression unfolded, falling nominal GDP caused the debt-to-GDP
ratio to soar to over 270%. A similar decline in nominal GDP today would push
the debt-to-GDP ratio to over 400%.
9 Note that we emphasise here oil prices as a ‘leading indicator’ rather than a
‘direct cause’ of inflation. The relationship between oil prices and inflation is
only partly anchored in the role of oil as a key production input. The more
important reason for the correlation is that the leading capitalist groups tend to
view the price of oil as a ‘barometer’ of future inflation and adjust their overall
pricing strategies in line with its fluctuations.
10 Due to mergers, the data in Figure 4.10 pertain to British Petroleum till 1997 and
to BP–Amoco since 1998; to Chevron and Texaco till 1999 and to Chevron-
Texaco since 2000; to Exxon and Mobil till 1998 and to ExxonMobil from 1999;
and to Royal–Dutch/Shell throughout.
11 The conflicts include the 1967 Arab–Israeli conflict; the 1973 Arab–Israeli
conflict; the 1979 Israeli invasion of Lebanon; the 1979 Iranian Revolution; the
1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan; the 1980 beginning of the Iraq–Iran War;
the 1990/1 first Gulf War; the 2000 beginning of the second Intifada; the 2001
Coalition invasion of Afghanistan; and the 2002 Coalition invasion of Iraq. 
12 Although there was no ‘official’ conflict in 1996–7, there was plenty of violence,
including an Iraqi invasion of Kurdish areas and US cruise missile attacks. 
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